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THE GRAND JURY: A CRITICAL EVALUATION*
Ovio C. LEWIS**
INTRODUCTION
T SEEMS in retrospect that our grand jury was a microcosm of grand juries
generally in that many of the problems noted in the literature were
manifest throughout our term. This supports the proposition that the weak-
nesses and defects of grand juries are not reflective of lack of zeal or
devotion to duty on the part of individual members of the juries, but rather
are indicative of systemic and institutional dysfunctionalities that are in-
herent in the grand jury system as it is presently constituted and organized.
Thus, the critical comments that appear herein ought not to be taken as
an attack upon the competence or integrity of a particular prosecutor, judge or
grand jury, but rather as directed at reformation of the current institutional
arrangement.
At the outset it is important to place this grand jury in perspective. The
individual members were dedicated, bright persons, who diligently and intelli-
gently executed their duty throughout the term. None, however, were lawyers,
and thus they were unfamiliar initially with the criminal code, evidence law,
constitutional law, grand jury rules, and other relevant legal material. Through-
out the term I was most favorably impressed with the skill and ability of
the jurors as laymen to interrogate witnesses and to analyze the facts and
relevant law in the cases brought before us.
When approached about acting as foreman, I was somewhat reticent,
primarily because of the heavy workload confronting me from September
to January: a full teaching load at the Law School at Case Western Reserve
University; completion of briefs and arguments at the Federal District Court,
Federal Court of Appeals, and United States Supreme Court; and a visit of a
week to El Paso, Texas, with subsequent submission of a report on the El Paso
delivery system of legal services for the indigent to the National Defender
Association in Washington, D. C. Nonetheless, the opportunity for significant
community service and a chance to experience the grand jury in action-
to feel it in my gizzard rather than merely know it as an abstraction in my
head-was too much for me to resist. Thus, the foreman for the term was
a law professor who, although not admitted to the Ohio Bar, did on oc-
casion practice in the Federal Courts, filing civil rights actions and habeas
corpus petitions for indigents. This meant that the foreman came to the
grand jury with a special concern for protecting the rights of the accused.
*This article is an outgrowth of the report done by the author while foreman of the
Cuyahoga County Grand Jury in September 1975.
**Dean, Center for the Study of Law, Nova University. A.B., J.D., Rutgers University;
LL.M., J.S.D., Columbia University School of Law. Special appreciation is expressed
for the research contributions of Thomas W. Renwand, University of Akron School of Law.
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In my constitutional law course I often expressed the view that the re-
quirement of an indictment by a grand jury was one of the most fundamental
rights guaranteed by the Constitution, since without an indictment the
individual was spared the ordeal of a trial-an ordeal whose cost in terms
of money and emotional trauma was not cancelled out by a not guilty ver-
dict. However, I knew that the United States Supreme Court had never
held that the fifth amendment's guarantee of requiring a grand jury in-
dictment or presentment was applicable to state prosecutions' even though
the Court had held almost all the other contemporarily significant guar-
antees in the federal Bill of Rights applicable to the states through the
Due Process Clause of the fourteenth amendment of the United States
Constitution. Perhaps it is this second-class treatment by the Court of the
grand jury provision that leads us to de-emphasize analysis of the institution
in law schools-which in turn may account for the general ignorance of
lawyers concerning the powers and attributes of grand juries (three county
prosecutors I asked were unable to tell me the meaning of a grand jury
presentment as opposed to an indictment).
Your naive and disingenuous foreman therefore approached the term
viewing the grand jury as the "people's panel" and a bulwark of protection
for the accused.2 As the "people's panel", of course, the jurors could
investigate and indict where for political and other reasons the prosecutor's
office might not act. At about the time of my appointment several areas
seemed likely candidates for such investigations: gratuities given to judges,
the Hill Properties fiasco, and the irregularities in the County Sheriff's
Department reported extensively in the Plain Dealer. In each instance, I
thought, for obvious reasons, the prosecutor's office might find great diffi-
culty in proceeding independently-but with the backing of an autonomous
and non-political grand jury which had conducted an in-depth investigation
appropriate and effective action would more likely occur.
After due consideration I decided the irregularities in the Sheriff's
Department reported in the news was the most apt area for a grand jury
investigation primarily because maintaining public confidence in the law
enforcement and criminal justice system is crucial. The commentary in the
Knapp Commission Report seemed most persuasive:
There are sound reasons for . . . a special concern with police cor-
ruption. The police have a unique place in our society. The policeman
is expected to "uphold the law" and "keep the peace." He is charged
with everything from traffic control to riot control. He is expected to
protect our lives and our property. As a result, society gives him
special powers and prerogatives, which include the right and obligation
'Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 538 (1884); Beck v. Washington, 396 U.S. 541
(1962).
2 Rodis, A Lawyer's Guide to Grand Jury Abuse, 14 CiuM. L. BULL. 123 (1978).
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to bear arms, along with the authority to take away our liberty by
arresting us.'
At a time when the rate of crime is exponentially increasing' it is
imperative that the crime fighting forces operate efficiently and with the
cooperation of all citizens. This is not possible where the public has little
or no confidence in the criminal justice system. Although we focused on
the Sheriff's Department, it is unfair to assume that corruption and a variety
of troublesome problems may not exist in other aspects of the criminal
justice system.
A frequent concern in our "era of accountability" is with procedural
due process-and the grand jury is one of the institutions which appears
to provide the accused with the process he is due. Yet, it is possible to pro-
vide the appearance without the reality. One recalls only too well Rabelais'
Judge Bridlegoose who was a most respected magistrate, especially because
of the time and diligent study he apparently gave to the briefs filed before
him, often resulting in a long delay in arriving at a decision. In actuality,
the great judge in making his decisions rolled dice-large ones for easy
cases and small ones for difficult cases-a classic case of a deceptive ap-
pearance of justice. Based on my study and experience with the institution
of the grand jury, I reluctantly must conclude that Rabelais could well
have used this respected body instead of Bridlegoose to make his point.
It bears emphasizing that this conclusion was reached after careful study
and consideration by one who previously was most sympathetic to the
institution.
I. ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT
Sometimes historical treatment of an institution reveals its strengths
and weaknesses more clearly than contemporary events which cannot
receive the same dispassionate and objective evaluation that is facilitated
by distance in time. Further, the value of historical insight is invaluable
since as Santayana put it: "He who does not know the past, is doomed to
repeat it."
There is no dearth of praise for the grand jury,5 characterized by
Thomas Jefferson as the "true tribunal of the people" and the "sacred
palladium of liberty."7 Frequently it is identified as the "bulwark of justice"S
3 THE KNAPP COMMISSION REPORT ON POLICE CORRUPTION 5 (1973). (Hereinafter referred
to as KNAPP COMMISSION.)
4 See UNrrED STATES DEPT. OF JUSTICE, SOUREBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 479-
482 (1979).
5 See Lee, The Grand Jury in Ohio: An Empirical Study, 4 U. DAY. L. REv. 325 (1979);
Note, The Grand Jury System Defended, N.Y.L.J. January 22, 1976, at 1.
6 Tim COMPLETE JEFFERSON 128 (S. Padover ed. 1943).
T Id. at 121. It should be noted that by 1791 Jefferson changed his opinion and charged
that the Federalists had transmuted the palladium of liberty into a political engine with the
jurors acting as inquisitors into freedom of speech.
8 Dewey, Grand Jury, The Bulwark of Justice, 19 THE PANEL 3 (1941).
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or "bulwark against the tyranny of dictatorship."' Governor Dewey admon-
ished New York Legislators in 1946 not to diminish the autonomous power
of grand juries so that they could continue to act as "the bulwark of pro-
tection for the innocent and the sword of the community against wrong-
doers."'1
Unfortunately history teaches that the grand jury was generally used
as an instrument to effect political ends. Indeed, the progenitor of the grand
jury, as originally conceived and constituted in 1166 by Henry II in the
Assize of Clarendon," certainly did not deserve encomiums or accolades
of praise as a protector of the people's rights. 2 Rather it was better described
as an administrative agency of the King, designed by him to enhance his
power over and against that of the barons and the church by vesting in
his agency jurisdiction over the crimes (previously that jurisdiction was
solely within the province of baronial and ecclesiastical courts) which
would thereby generate judicial revenue for him from fines and court
costs. Helene Schwartz concludes:
9 Weyrauch, Grand Jury, A Bulwark Against the Tyranny of Dictatorship, 20 THE PANEL 5
(1942).
10 New York Times, March 3, 4, 15, 19, 27, April 4, 1946, quoted in R. YOUNGER, THE
PEOPLE'S PANEL: THE GRAND JURY IN THE UNITED STATES 1634-1941 241 (1963).
11The Assize of Clarendon was presaged by the Constitutions of Clarendon signed re-
luctantly by Thomas Becket in January 1164, which authorized the early grand jury to charge
sinners in ecclesiastical courts. The Assize of Clarendon, in pertinent part, provided:
Chapter I
First the aforesaid King Henry established by the counsel of all his barons for the
maintenance of peace and justice, that inquiry shall be made in every county and in
every hundred by the twelve most lawful men of the hundred and by the four most
.lawful men of every vill, upon oath that they shall speak the truth, whether in their
hundred or Vill there be any man who is accused or believed to be a robber,
murderer, thief, or a receiver of robbers, murderers, or thieves since the King's ac-
cession. And this the justices and sheriffs shall enquire before themselves.
Chapter V
In the cause of those who have been arrested through the aforesaid oath of this
assize, no one shall have court or judgment, or chattels, except the lord king in his
court before his justices, and the lord king shall have all their chattels.
12The early progenitors of the American grand jury are not easily identified. It is, of
course, possible that there is a connection with analogous accusatory bodies in early Athens.
It is known that such bodies existed among the Saxons (who came to England in the
Fifth Century), the Scandinavians, and the Franks. Prof. Morse suggests that the main
precursor was the Carlovingian inquisitio brought to England by the Normans, "which
consisted of a group of neighbors who were called upon by a public officer to answer,
on oath, some question." Morse, A Survey of the Grand Jury System, 10 OREGON L. REV.
101, 116 (1931). See also ADAMS, THE ORIGIN OF THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION 106-35 (2d
ed. 1920); EDWARD'S, THE GRAND JURY (1906); FORSYTHE, HISTORY OF TRIAL BY JURY
(1875); 1 HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (3d ed. 1922); STEPHEN, A HISTORY
OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND (1883); THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVI-
DENCE 24-84 (1898); CRIMINAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE COMMITTEE, ANTITRUST SECTION,
ABA HANDBOOK ON ANTITRUST GRAND JURY INVESTIGATIONS (J. Welch ed. 1978); GREEN, the
Centralization of Norman Justice Under Henry II, in I SELECT ESSAYS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN
LEGAL HISTORY 111-38 (1907); Schwartz, Demythologizing the Historic Myth of the Grand
Jury, 10 AM. CRiM. L. REV. 701 (1972).
[Vol. 13:1
4
Akron Law Review, Vol. 13 [1980], Iss. 1, Art. 3
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol13/iss1/3
THE GRAND JURY
Henry's grand jury was not intended to be a protector of the people.
Indeed, the idea that Henry would willingly concede a protective meas-
ure to the people as against his own royal excesses simply does not
make sense and attributes to Henry a most unlikely beneficence. The
thrust of Henry's grand jury was to effectuate his desire for absolutism
by rendering powerless the traditional baronial courts and by weakening
the ecclesiastical courts, to say nothing of the added benefit of the
large income which the courts contributed to the royal treasury. 3
Over the centuries the grand jury continued as an accusatory body,
charging citizens with crime based on the jurors' own knowledge of com-
munity affairs, or later, accusations brought by private parties or the state.
By the Seventeenth Century trial by ordeal, which normally had followed
an indictment, was replaced by a trial by a petit jury so that the grand
jury was by then, in fact as well as theory, only an accusatory and not
guilt-determining body. In 1681, two cases that came before grand juries
appeared to herald the development of the institution as one with great
potential for protecting the individual from arbitrary prosecution by the
state: the cases of Stephen Colledge, and Lord Ashley, Earl of Shaftes-
bury. Richard Kuh succinctly notes the political climate:
By 1681, the Puritan dictatorship of Cromwell had been replaced for
some twenty-one years by the Restoration of the Stuart rulers. In 1679,
the Exclusion Bill had been introduced; it was designed to bar suc-
cession to the throne of Charles II's younger brother, James, a Catholic.
It barely missed becoming law in 1680 when, passed by the House of
Commons, it was rejected by the Lords. At the same time rumors
of a plot to assassinate the King and to establish his bastard son,
the Protestant Duke of Monmouth in his stead, discredited his op-
ponents and strengthened his pro-Catholic government.'
It was in this setting that the Protestant Stephen Colledge was charged
by numerous witnesses, who appeared before a Middlesex grand jury, with
threatening and conspiring to kill the King. The King's prosecutor drew up
and presented an indictment of Colledge to the grand jury. The grand jurors,
who were Whigs and sympathetic with Colledge, refused to indict. The
foreman, Wilmore, who subscribed upon the indictment "ignoramus" ("we
know nothing of it"-the equivalent of today's "no bill") was later arrested
for his boldness and subsequently fled the country to save his life. Colledge
did not escape since the King merely went to Oxford where he could
count on a more receptive grand jury. This second grand jury heard the
same evidence presented in Middlesex and acceded to the prosecutor's
wish, indicting Colledge who was subsequently convicted and executed.
13 See Schwartz, supra note 12, at 701.
'4 Kuh, The Grand Jury "Presentment" Foul Blow or Fair Play? 55 COLUM. L. REv. 1103,
1107 n. 15 (1955). For additional background on the period see ADAMS, CONSTITUTIONAL
HISTORY OF ENGLAND 334-61 (1920).
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Three months after Colledge's execution, Lord Ashley, Earl of Shaftes-
bury, was charged with high treason by the royal prosecutor who presented
the state's case before a London grand jury. Again a Whig-dominated grand
jury refused to indict. However, when the Royalists rigged the election of
two Tory sheriffs (who would be given the duty of selecting grand jurors)
and a Tory Mayor of London was elected, the King was assured of Royalist
control over grand juries. Seeing that the handwriting on the wall was
no longer "ignoramus," Shaftesbury fled and later died unhappily in exile
in Amsterdam. Schwartz' evaluation of the case is eminently sound:
Far from epitomizing the often praised independence of the grand
jury in political cases, the Earl of Shaftesbury's case, like that of
Colledge, only serves to prove the extreme vulnerability of that body
to the cynical machinations of the executive.15
Nonetheless, these cases were extolled as manifestations of grand jury
autonomy and examples of how the people's panel could protect the in-
dividual from unjust persecution by the state. Recently, a federal judge
observed that "[t]hese two cases are celebrated as establishing the grand
jury as a bulwark against the oppression and despotism of the Crown." 6
Regardless of the ugly realities, the Colledge and Shaftesbury cases
were cited as examples of how the grand jury could provide security from
malicious and unwarranted prosecution by the State in a series of influential
tracts published contemporaneously with the decisions.' Each tract received
broad distribution in the American Colonies. 6 This literature, along with
the tradition of independence and resistance displayed by colonial grand
juries that refused to indict those who opposed the English rule," enhanced
immensely the prestige of the institution --- so much so that the guarantee
of an indictment or presentment by a grand jury was included in the federal
Bill of Rights" and in state constitutions," including that of Ohio." The
'5 Schwartz, supra note 12, at 719-20.
Is In re Russo, 53 F.R.D. 564, 568 (C.D. Calif. 1971).
17 CARE, ENGLISH LIBERTIES OR FREE BORN SUBJECT'S INHERITANCE (1698); HAWLES, THE
ENGLISHMAN'S RIGHTS (1680); SOMERS, THE SECURITY OF ENGLISHMEN'S LivEs OR THE
TRUST, POWER AND DUTY OF GRAND JURIES OF ENGLAND (1682).
Is See R. YOUNGER, supra note 10, at 21-22. Kuh suggests that Somers may have been
offering counterfeit praise. See Kuh, supra note 14, at 1108 n. 18.
'
9 See R. YOUNGER, supra note 10.
2o The grand jury entered the post-Revolutional period high in the esteem of the American
people. The institution had proved valuable indeed in opposing the imperial government
and indictment by a grand jury had assumed the position of the cherished right. Francis
Hopkinson, Revolutionary pamphleteer, reflected this feeling when he pictured the grand
jury as "a body of truth and power inferior to none but the legislature itself." Id. at 41.
2The fifth amendment of the United States Constitution provides: "No person shall be
held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or
indictment of a Grand Jury. ...."
22 ILL. CONST. art 1, § 7 provides:
No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offer unless on indictment of a
grand jury, except in cases in which the punishment is by fine or by imprisonment
[Vol. 13:1
6
Akron Law Review, Vol. 13 [1980], Iss. 1, Art. 3
https://ideaexchange.uakron. du/akronlawreview/vol13/iss1/3
THE GRAND JURY
Ohio Supreme Court long ago recognized the basis for including such a
provision in the Bill of Rights.2"
Sadly, the history of grand jury abuse and manipulation was repeated
in these United States. The Federalists used grand juries to indict Repub-
licans, such as Matthew Lyon for expressing anti-Federalist views. (Lyons
had the effrontery to suggest that President John Adams had an "un-
bounded thirst for ridiculous pomp, foolish adulation, and selfish avarice.") 25
And Republicans in turn used biased panels to indict Federalists. The
refusal of a Louisiana grand jury to indict Aaron Burr, and the government's
ultimate success in obtaining an indictment on the same charges from a
Virginia grand jury gives one a dejd vu feeling vis-a-vis the Shaftesbury case2"
In our own time we have frequently witnessed the pliability of grand
juries,2' manipulated like putty in the hands of experienced prosecutors.
prosecutors. The most notorious recent example was provided by the
Watergate episode.28
II. FUNCTION
Although it is clear that historically the Grand Jury was designed
as an agency of the executive, and in fact generally acted like a ventrilo-
quist's dummy, the myth of the institution as a bulwark to protect the
other than in the penitentiary, in cases of impeachment, and in cases arising in the
militia when in actual service in time of war or public danger. The General Assembly
by law may abolish the grand jury or further limit its use.
No person shall be held to answer for a crime punishable by death or by imprisonment
in the penitentiary unless either the initial charge has been brought by indictment of
a grand jury or the person has been given a prompt preliminary hearing to establish
probable cause.
23 The Constitution of the State of Ohio Article 1, in the Bill of Rights, subsection 10,
provides: "No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime,
unless on presentment or indictment of a grand jury; . . ."
24 State, ex rel. Doerfler v. Price, 101 Ohio St. 50 (1920).
This constitutional provision at the time of its adoption assumed the grand jury to
be an existing institution in Ohio; or, in short, recognized the grand jury as it existed
at common law. It is unnecessary to trace the earliest history of the grand jury
further than to say that it has existed under the common law for centuries, and, while
originally it was a body not only of accusers but of tryers, for centuries at least it
has acted only in the former capacity. Its adoption in this country both in federal
and state jurisdictions has no doubt been upon the theory that it was one of the
most substantial and serviceable guarantees against official tyranny, malicious prose-
cution, and ill-advised and expensive trials, which might generally be avoided if the
formal accusation of crime were first made by one's peers, as represented by the
grand jury. One's individual rights are those safeguarded against private malice, party
passion, or governmental abuse.
Id. at 54.
25 Schwartz, supra note 12, at 722-727.
26 Id. at 732-738.
2T The Grand fury Network: How the Nixon Administration Has Secretly Perverted a Tra-
ditional Safeguard of Individual Rights, NATION, Jan. 3, 1972, at 5; Solowey, The Grand
Jury: Making Trouble for Movement Lawyers?, JuRis DOCTOR, March, 1976 at 36; How
to Get Your Man, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 1. 1976, at 113.
28 See Solowey, The Grand Jury and Post-Watergate, 10 TRIAL 32 (1974).
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individual from despotic and arbitrary prosecution led to placing in the
Bill of Rights the requirement of a presentment or indictment of a grand
jury as a prerequisite to prosecution. Although common law grand juries
had from the earliest times exercised investigatory and other powers,29
placing the guarantee of grand jury intervention in bills of rights under-
scored the drafters' intention that it act as a protector of individual rights."0
As the Supreme Court observed:
Historically, [the grand jury] has been regarded as a primary security
to the innocent against hasty, malicious and oppressive persecution;
it serves the invaluable function in our society of standing between the
accuser and the accused, whether the latter be an individual, minority
group, or other, to determine whether a charge is founded upon reason
or was dictated by an intimidating power or by malice and personal
ill will.
True, when an indictment or presentment is returned the grand jury
does charge an individual with a crime, but the tail wags the dog to con-
clude that the grand jury's "dominant purpose [is] the charging of crime.""
The grand jury is properly viewed as "[an important instrument of effective
law enforcement"" only in that public confidence in the fairness of the
criminal justice system is an essential prerequisite to effective law enforce-
ment. Clearly, a body charged primarily with the charging of crime is a
most unlikely bulwark for protecting the innocent. Although the same
stringent standards of due process applicable to the trials are not binding
29 It has been noted that the "ancesteors of our 'grand jurors' are from the first neither
exactly accusers, nor exactly witnesses; they are to give voice to common repute." 2 F.
POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH LAW 642 (2d ed. 1909). See also Bracy
v. United States, 435 U.S. 1301 (Rehnquish, Circuit Justice 1978); Hannah v. Larche,
363 U.S. 420 (1960); Beavers v. Henkel, 194 U.S. 73 (1904).
80 mhe grand jury's most important function became the task of standing "steadfast be-
tween the crown and the people in the defense of the liberty of the citizen . . ." consid-
ered in the light of its history in American law, the more important of the grand jury's
roles would appear to be its protective function. In addition to the fact that, at the time
the institution was enshrined in the Constitution, English law stressed the protective
feature, the placement of the grand jury guarantee in our Bill of Rights as a restraint
upon governmental prerogative-accompanied by the guarantees against self-incrimination,
double jeopardy and deprivation of due process-convincingly indicates the dominant
character of the protective role. Note, The Rights of a Witness before a Grand Jury, 1967
DurE L.J. 97, 100-101 (1967).
s"Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 390 (1962). See also Hoffman v. United States, 341
U.S. 479, 485 (1951); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 59 (1906); L. ORFIELD, CRIMINAL
PRocunURE FROM ARREST TO APPEAL 144-146 (1947). See also Sterlich & Jastovice,
Grand Juries, Grand Jurors and the Constitution, 1 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 63 (1974).
32Kidh, supra note 14, at 1125. Lester Orfield also appears on occasion almost to turn
the purpose of the grand jury on end. "The Grand Jury serves two great functions. One
is to bring to trial persons accused of crime upon just grounds. The other is to protect
against unfounded or malicious prosecutions by insuring that no criminal proceedings
will be undertaken without a disinterested determination of probable guilt." Orfield, The
Federal Grand Jury, 22 F.R.D. 343, 394 (1958). (emphasis added).
"aBranzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 701 (1972). The grand jury's function is as an
investigative body; it is not the final arbiter of guilt or innocence. United States v. Wash-
ington, 431 U.S. 181 (1978).
[Vol. 13:1
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on grand jury proceedings, nonetheless, the same psychological processes
can operate, unfairly weighting the institution against the individual the
guarantee was designed to protect in favor of the prosecutor. The Supreme
Court's comment on the Michigan "one-man grand jury" in In re Murchison"
is, therefore, quite relevant. 5
For the individual accused of crime, the indictment signals the onset
of an inevitable series of humiliating and costly ordeals.
[M]erely to be charged with a crime is a punishing experience. The
defendant's reputation is immediately damaged, usually irreparably,
despite an ultimate failure to convict. Anguish and anxiety become a
daily presence for the defendant, and for the defendant's family and
friends. The emotional strains of the criminal trial process have been
known to destroy marriages and to cause alienation or emotional
disturbance among the accused's children. The financial burden can
be enormous, and may well include loss of employment because of
absenteeism due to pretrial detention or time required away from work
during hearings and the trial, or because of the mere fact of having
been named as a criminal defendant. The trial itself, building up to
the terrible anxiety during jury deliberations, is a torturing experience.36
Perhaps every prospective grand juror should sit through a trial, and
talk with defendants so that he could come to appreciate the onerous nature
of the impact of an indictment on the accused." '
Given the critical significance of an indictment, is the grand jury gen-
erally, and was our particular grand jury, an effective institution for filtering
out of the system those who should not be charged with commission of a
crime? And if it is not, then are there reforms that can make it into an
effective screening institution? To answer these basic questions requires
examination of the powers and the weaknesses of the grand jury as it is
currently conceived.38
34349 U.S. 133 (1955).
8 A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process. Fairness of course
requires an absence of actual bias in the trial of cases. But our system of law has
always endeavored to prevent even the probability of unfairness. To this end no man
can be a judge in his own case and no man is permitted to try cases where he has
an interest in the outcome. That interest cannot be defined with precision. Circum-
stances and relationships must be considered.
349 U.S. at 136.
86 M. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETmIcs iN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM 84 (1975).
37 Our grand jury did, of course, take a tour of the County Jail and talk with inmates.
38 Although references often pertain to the attributes of federal grand juries, it must be
noted that state grand juries traditionally have exercised broader powers. See Justice Stephen
Field's Charge to Grand Jury, 30 Fed. Cas. No. 18, 255 at 994 (C.C.D. Calif. 1872); R.
YOUNGER, supra note 10, at 46. Congress has not developed many guidelines delineating
federal grand jury powers. See In re Grand Jury, 315 F. Supp. 662, 673 (D. Md. 1970).
See generally, FED. R. CGuM. P. 6; Title I of the Organizd Crime Control Act of 1970,
18 U.S.C. §§ 3331-3333 (1970).
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III. ATTRIBUTES AND POWERS
John Chipman Gray once observed that statutes are not law but
only sources of law since until construed by a court you really don't know
what they mean. His point is especially applicable to the law regarding
the grand jury in Ohio due to the sketchy and vague nature of the relevant
statutes, and the complicating fact that the statutes are superseded by the
Ohio Criminal Rules where there is any inconsistency."
The rules provide for one or more grand juries composed of nine
regular members and as many as five alternates.'0 The foreman is appointed
by the court, but the other jurors are randomly selected qualified electors.,"
This selection process produces a grand jury of laymen, with a foreman
who is generally a "community leader,"-on occasion a lawyer. Since virtu-
ally no training or instruction is offered, "2 other than some brief intro-
ductory comments by the presiding judge and the prosecutor, the state of
the institution created is one without a specific well-defined goal, no identi-
fiable constituency (other than the amorphous "public"), no motivating
institutional self-interest, no professionals with even a modicum of expe-
rience (especially since continuity of membership is generally unheard of),
no mechanism for modifying and improving its procedures and structure,
and, as we shall see, few resources under its control. "
Nonetheless, the grand jury in Ohio, as elsewhere, appears to possess
enormous power. Pursuant to its subpoena power it can require individuals
from anywhere in the state to appear before it and to produce documents."
and compel this testimony under threat of contempt citations. 5 The grand
jury may exclude all persons from its proceedings pursuant to the following
language:
Who may be present: The prosecuting attorney, the witness under ex-
amination, interpreters when needed and, for the purpose of taking
the evidence, a stenographer or operator of a recording device may
be present while the grand jury is in session, but no person other than
39 A reading of Elder, Grand Jury, 26 OHIO JUR. 2d 249-294 (1963) requires prior study of
Ohio Criminal Rules to determine the extent to which they have rendered much of the
commentary inaccurate and misleading.
4 0 OHIO R. CRIM. P. 6(A).
41 Omo R. CRIM. P. 6(c); Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 2939.03 (Page 1975).
42 See discussion infra at notes 30 & 31. The presiding judge is required by statute to inform
the jury of its duties, but there is no requirement that he instruct them concerning their
powers. Otno REV. CODE ANN. § 2939.07 (Page 1975).
43 For an excellent analysis of these systematic problems, see Bickner, The Grand Jury
... A Layman's Assessment, 48 CALIF. S.B.J. 660, 662 (1973). See also McGaughey, Trials
of a Grand Juror, 65 A.B.A.J. 725 (1979). "Our little green book specifically said 'an
accused may be given the opportunity by the grand jury to appear before it, and the
grand jurors may always seek the advice of the judge.' Neither proved to be possible
for our jury." Id. at 726.
44See Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 2939.12 (Page 1975); Ono R. CRIM. P. 17(f).
5 Oimo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2939.14, .15 (Page 1975).
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the jurors may be present while the grand jury is deliberating or
voting.46
When this language is contrasted with that of the statutory provision it
replaced, the rule could be construed to authorize the grand jury to exclude
assistant prosecutors, and even to preclude the prosecutor from interrogating
witnesses. ' T It could also be read as an exclusive listing of those permitted
in the jury room while testimony is taken, thus precluding parents from
entering while their small children testified.
But enlightened jurists know that statutes and rules are not to be read
literally where the effect would be absurd or unreasonable. Interpreting
Rule 6(D) in light of its manifest purpose, and to permit the grand jury
to operate effectively and fairly, during our term the assistant prosecutors
assigned by the county prosecuting attorney were permitted to be present
during the taking of testimony and to interrogate witnesses. On occasion
the assistant prosecutors were instructed not to make statements concerning
the horrendous deleterious impact on society of certain criminal activities.
Such comments in a trial would constitute grounds for a mistrial, and have
no valid relevance to a determination of whether a particular individual
ought to be indicted. The foreman did permit, with the concurrence of the
assistant prosecutors, parents of small children to be present while the
children-complainants testified. But for the presence of the parent, these
small and frightened victims of sexual assaults would have been unable to
testify and those who allegedly committed these crimes would escape prose-
cution-surely an unreasonable result produced by a wooden reading of
the rule. 8
The grand jury also has the power to obtain a grant of use immunity for
a witness who refuses to testify and thereby compel his testimony even
though the witness has invoked the fifth amendment privilege against
self-incrimination.49 On several occasions during the term witnesses did
41 Omo R. CRiM. P. 6(D).
47 The earlier statutory provision had provided:
The prosecuting attorney or assistant prosecuting attorney may at all time appear
before the grand jury to give information relative to a matter cognizable by it, or
advise upon a legal matter when required. Such prosecuting attorney may interrogate
witnesses before such jury when the jury or the prosecuting attorney may find it
necessary . . . (emphasis added).
OIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2939.10 (Page 1975). Under this section the Attorney General
and his special counsel have and exercise the rights, privileges, and powers of prosecuting
attorneys. Hammond v. Brown, 323 F. Supp. 326, 352 (1971) affd. 450 F.2d 480 (6th
Cir. 1971).
48 Nor did the presence of the parents violate the secrecy requirement of Osno R. CRaM. P.
6(E).
4 9 See OHmo REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.44 (Page 1975); State v. Prato, 2 Ohio App. 2d 115
(Mahoning Ct. 1965). Use immunity, as opposed to transactional immunity, does not mean
the witness compelled to testify cannot be prosecuted for the crime about which he testifies.
It merely means that neither his own testimony nor any evidence obtained as a result of
his testimony can be used against him. Transactional immunity is not constitutigoally
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invoke the privilege and immunity was obtained, whereupon they testified
fully.
In United States v. Calandra,5" Mr. Justice Powell, writing for a six
to three majority, stated that a witness called before a grand jury may not
refuse to answer questions on the "grounds that they are based on evidence
obtained from an unlawful search and seizure."" In most instances the
grand jury may conduct broad investigations unhindered by the technical
evidentiary rules governing criminal trials.5
Full Miranda warnings need not be given to a witness called to testify
before a grand jury about criminal activities in which he may have been
involved. 3 Subsequently, a citizen's privilege against self-incrimination will
not allow him to perjure himself before a grand jury." Newsmen, however,
cannot be compelled to reveal the names of informants," although they
can be forced to relate to the grand jury the information given to them
by the informants.56
The investigatory power of the grand jury is extremely broad."' An
indictment may even be returned by a properly impaneled grand jury based
on evidence obtained in violation of the defendant's constitutional rights.58
This is because the grand jury has traditionally been an investigative body;
required. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972). See also United States v. Nobles,
422 U.S. 225, 230 (1974); United States v. Rocco, 587 F.2d 144, 147 (1978). Note
This Sixth Amendment Right to Have Use Immunity Granted to Defense Witnesses, 91
HARv. L. REv. 1266 (1978).
50414 U.S. 338 (1974).
52 Id. at 339.
52 Id. at 343.
53 United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564 (1975).
Under settled principles, the Fifth Amendment does not confer an absolute right to
decline to respond to a grand jury inquiry; the privilege does not negate the duty to
testify but simply conditions that duty . . . Accordingly, the witness, though possibly
engaged in some criminal enterprise, can be required to answer before a grand jury,
so long as there is not compulsion to answer questions that are self-incriminating; the
witness can, of course, stand on the privilege, assured that its protections is as broad
as the mischief against which it seeks to guard.
Id. at 572, 574.
54 United States v. Wong, 431 U.S. 174 (1977).
55 The newsman's privilege is based on Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2739.04 (Page Supp. 1978).
See also New Jersey v. Jascalevich (Farber), 78 N.J. Super. 259, 394 A.2d 330 (1978),
cert. denied, sub. nom. New York Times Co. v. New Jersey, 99 S. Ct. 241 (1978); Branz-
burg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972). See also Piercing a Newsman's "Shield," TIME, Aug. 7,
1978, at 74; Comment, The Supreme Court and the Press: Freedom or Privilege? 12 AKRON
L. REv. 261 (1978); Note, 12 AKRON L. REV. 291 (1978).
5
eSee Forest Hills Utility Co. v. City of Health, 66 Ohio Ops. 2d 66, 302 N.E.2d 593,
596 (1973). In Jascalevich reporter Farber was jailed for forty days (he was released when
Jascalevich was acquitted October 24, 1978) and fined. The New York Times paid
$285,000 in fines. The Supreme Court refused to review the case. See also White, WHY THE
JAILING OF FARBER TERRmEs Ma, N.Y. Times Mag., Nov. 26, 1978, at 27.
57 See Grand Jury, § 32, OHmo JuR. 2d (1963).
AsUnited States v. Washington, 431 U.S 181 (1977).
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"it is not the final arbiter or guilt or innocence."59 The Supreme Court has
observed:
[The Grand Jury] is a grand inquest, a body with powers of investiga-
tion and inquisition, the scope of whose inquiries is not to be limited
narrowly by questions of propriety or forecasts of probable result of
the investigation, or by doubts whether any particular individual will
be found properly subject to an accusation of crime."0
This broad power to investigate is generally founded on the common
law tradition,6' statutory authority,6" and the presentment language in the
constitution. 3 Although this constitutional language has not been imple-
mented, and a defendant clearly can demand an indictment rather than
a presentment," it is not clear that a grand jury cannot issue a presentment
based on the constitutional mandate."
This broad power to investigate is generally founded on the common
law tradition,6' statutory authority," and the presentment language in the
constitution. 3 Although this constitutional language has not been imple-
mented, and a defendant clearly can demand an indictment rather than
a presentment, " it is not clear that a grand jury cannot issue a presentment
based on the constitutional mandate.65
Thus a member of the grand jury can personally inquire into matters
in the community, hear complaints, and bring such of these matters as
he deems desirable, before the grand jury.66 During the term the foreman and
deputy foreman met with the Citizens Bar Association on several occasions
to hear complaints from members who felt that the County Prosecutor's
Office would not give them a fair hearing.67 The same type of distrust was
59Id. at 191.
60Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 283 (1919), cited with approval in United States
v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343 (1974).
61 The Supreme Court has stated that the fifth amendment grand jury has the "same powers
that pertained to its British prototype." 250 U.S. at 282. The reliance on common law tra-
dition to define the grand jury's power is often seen. 406 U.S. at 443.
62 0mo REv. CODE ANN. § 2939.06 (Page 1975).
63 Omo CoNsT. art. I, § 10.
64 OIo R. CRIm. P. 7(a).
65 During the term the grand jury did consider issuing presentments, but realizing that no
criminal prosecutions could proceed without indictment, the idea was dropped. See generally
United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1965); L. CLARK, THE GRAND JURY: THE USE
AND ABUSE OF POLrrIcAL POWER (1975); Kuh, supra note 14, at 1103.
66 The scope of the grand jury's investigation is not only to consider the cases of those
persons bound over by magistrates, but to take in charge matters presented by the court
or the prosecuting attorney, and other matters disclosed and brought to light in the jury
room during the investigations. It may investigate matters of which fellow jurors are
witnesses, or to which jurors may call attention. All these things come within the purview
of the oath prescribed by statute to be administered to the grand jury. State v. Laning,
7 Nisi Prius & Gen. T. Rep. 281, 290 (Huron Cty. 1908).
67 The feeling that the prosecutor's office is biased and reluctant to act concerning com-
plaints about corruption in government, especially the judicial and law enforcement branches,
is frequently expressed. See L. CLARK, supra note 65, at 116.
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manifested by law enforcement officers who brought complaints to the
foreman. Some asked to testify without the presence of the assistant prose-
cutor, but did nonetheless testify with him in the room after it was explained
that under the law he had the right to be present. This distrust and fear of
establishment agents was accompanied often by a view of the legal estab-
lishment akin to that expressed by Charles Dickens who characterized it
as the "circumlocution office." This was not an isolated instance, but part
of a general lack of confidence in our government that antedates, and was
exacerbated by Watergate.
We saw much evidence of this distrust. Many people ... brought the
Commission evidence of serious corruption which they said they
would not have disclosed to the police or to a District Attorney or to
the City's Department of Investigation. It makes no difference whether
or not this distrust is justified. The harsh reality is that it exists. This
distrust is not confined to members of the public. Many policemen
came to us only upon our assurance that we would not disclose their
identities to the Department or to any District attorney. 8
The Citizens' complaints were analyzed to ascertain if they were more
than frivolous and if substantiated would involve felonies. 9 This screening
was especially significant where the complaints involved matter publicized
in the news media since as soon as the witnesses were called by the grand
jury the media would know and most assuredly would publicize the fact
of the grand jury investigation. When the allegations were not frivolous, and
appeared to involve charges of felonious conduct, the foreman asked the
complainants to come before the grand jury to present the charges. Until
that time such complaints were not considered matters occurring before
the grand jury.70
The grand jury proceedings are secret, 1 in accordance with the lan-
guage of Ohio Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(E)."2
8 See KNAPP COMMISSION, supra note 3, at 14.
69 Although the grand jury can return indictments for misdemeanors (our grand jury did
indict, at the request of the prosecutor, three persons for non-support of dependents, a
misdemeanor of the first degree under Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.21 (Page 1975) tradi-
tionally indictments are restricted to charges constituting felonies.
7 0Thus the constraints of Omo R. CIuM. R. 6(E) were not applicable and the presence
of persons other than grand jurors while listening to complaints was unobjectionable.
71 Rule 6(e) of the FED. RULES CR. PRoc. was amended by Congress in 1977 to rectify
some of the confusion caused by the original rule. See S. REP. No. 95-354, 95th Cong.,
1st Sess. 6 (1977); reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CONo. & AD. NEWS 527, 529-30. Rule 6(e)
provides:
(1) General Rule. A grand juror, an interpreter, a stenographer, a operator of a
recording device, a typist who transcribes recorded testimony, an attorney for the
Government, or any person to whom disclosure is made under paragraph 2(A)(ii)
of this subdivision shall not disclose matters occurring before the grand jury, except
as otherwise provided for in these rules. No obligation of secrecy may be im-
posed on any person except in accordance with this rule. A knowing violation
of rule 6 may be punished as a contempt of court.
[Vol. 13:1
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The final sentence of the Ohio rule makes it clear that neither the
prosecutor, court, nor grand jury can impose an obligation of secrecy on
a witness who desires to relate to the news media or others the nature and
content of his testimony before the grand jury. This aspect of the rule
is apparently not understood or appreciated by some grand jurors," and
even some judges. It is true that the prohibition against imposing even an
obligation of secrecy on a witness would yield to the constitutional demand
for due process, but only where the court first determines that the disclosure
(2) Exceptions-
(A) Disclosure otherwise prohibited by this rule of matters occurring before
the grand jury, other than its deliberations and the vote of any grand juror,
may be made to-
(i) an attorney for the government for use in the performance of such
attorney's duty; and
(ii) such government personnel as are deemed necessary by an attorney for
the government to assist an attorney for the government in the performance
of such attorney's duty to enforce Federal criminal law.
(B) Any person to whom matters are disclosed under subparagraph (A) (ii) of
this paragraph shall not utilize that grand jury material for any purpose other
than assisting the attorney for the government in the performance of such
attorney's duty to enforce Federal criminal law. An attorney for the govern-
ment shall promptly provide the district court, before which was impaneled the
grand jury whose material has been so disclosed, with the names of the
persons to whom such disclosure has been made.
(C) Disclosure otherwise prohibited by this rule of matters occurring before
the grand jury may also be made.
(i) when so directed by a court preliminarily to or in connection with a
judicial proceeding; or
(ii) when permitted by a court at the request of the defendant, upon a show-
ing that grounds may exist for a motion to dismiss the indictment because
of matters occurring before the grand jury.
12 Deliberations of the grand jury and the vote of any grand juror shall not be disclosed.
Disclosure of other matters occurring before the grand jury may be made to the prose-
cuting attorney for use in the performance of his duties. A grand juror, prosecuting
attorney, interpreter, stenographer, operator of the recording device, or typist who
transcribes recorded testimony, may disclose matters occurring before the grand jury,
other than the deliberations of a grand jury or the vote of the grand juror, but may
disclose such matters only when so directed by the court preliminary to or in con-
nection with a judicial proceeding, or when permitted by the court at the request of the
defendant upon a showing that grounds may exist for a motion to dismiss the in-
dictment because of matters occurring before the grand jury. No grand juror, officer
of the court, or other person shall disclose that an indictment has been found against
a person before such indictment is filed and the case docketed. The court may direct
that an indictment shall be kept secret until the defendant is in custody or has been
released pursuant to Rule 46. In that event the clerk shall seal the indictment, the
indictment shall not be docketed by name until after the apprehension of the accused,
and no person shall disclose the findings of the indictment when necessary for the
issuance of a warrant or summons. No obligation of secrecy may be imposed upon
any person except in accordance with this rule. (Emphasis Added).
73 One grand jury foreman commented in his report:
But it annoyed our Grand Jurors to see TV reporters with mikes in hand, and cameras
set up inside and outside the Court House, trying to wheedle comment from witnesses
who had been before the Special Grand Jury . . . . Extensive security was set up to
protect the witnesses and Grand Jurors; nevertheless, the media workers tried daily to
break it. . . . That the [newsmen] invariably got no news was obvious, but the fact
that they tried and would have dissemenated information if they could have got it,
was unethical, unprofessional and outrageous. CUYAHOGA COUNTY GaRN JURY REPORT,
September 1973 Term (P. Porter, Foreman) 8-9 (1974).
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would constitute an imminent threat to a defendant's right to a fair trial. 4
During our term it was reported that some witnesses that appeared
before the grand jury were ordered not to comment about their testimony
before the grand jury. Absent an over-riding constitutional due process
constraint, such orders, if imposed, clearly violated Ohio Rule of Criminal
Procedure 6(E).7 5
The reach of the rule is not readily apparent from its face. As noted
above, it was interpreted this term to permit parents of small children to
be present while they testified."0 It appeared that such an interpretation
was consistent with the purpose of the rules and the specific purposes of
Rule 6(E).71 One purpose of the rule is to protect the grand jurors them-
selves."8 Generally, the rule is said to serve the following ends:
(1) To prevent the escape of those whose indictment may be con-
templated;
(2) to insure the utmost freedom to the grand jury in its deliberations,
and to prevent persons subject to indictment or their friends from
importuning the grand jurors;
(3) to prevent subordination of perjury or tampering with the wit-
nesses who may testify before the grand jury and later appear
at the trial of those indicted by it;
(4) to encourage free and untrammeled disclosures by persons who
have information with respect to the commission of crimes;
(5) to protect the innocent accused who is exonerated from disclosure
of the fact that he has been under investigation, and from the
expense of standing trial where there was no probability of guilt.7 9
The authorities uniformly agree that the purpose is not to protect defend-
ants."0 Thus, if grand jury minutes are kept the accused is not entitled to
74 Any court order that imposes a significant restraint on free expression bears "a heavy
presumption against its constitutional validity." New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S.
713, 714 (1971); Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971);
Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963). But see Gannett Co., Inc. v. De-
Pasquale, 99 S. Ct. 2898 (1979); Williams v. Stafford, 589 P.2d 332 (1979).
75 Omo R. CRiM. P. 6(E) does not, however, impose a penalty for its violation. See State
v. E.W. Scripps Co., 172 N.E. 2d 178, 181 (Cuyahoga Cty. 1960). It is doubtful that a
judge who violates this rule could be held in contempt based on his oath of office in
light of other due process considerations. See Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307
(1967); Baggatt v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958);
Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939).
76 See discussion at supra note 48.
77 Omo R. CRIM. P. I(B) (Page Supp. 1979) provides: "These rules are intended to
provide for the just determination of every criminal proceeding. They shall be construed
and applied to secure the fair, impartial, speedy, and sure administration of justice, sim-
plicity in procedure, and the elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay."
7 8 See Judging the Grand Jury, TIME, Feb. 7, 1972, at 59.
79United States v. Amazon Industrial Chemical Corp., 55 F.2d 254, 261 (D.Md. 1931).
See also Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, 360 U.S. 395, 405 (1959) (Justice
Brennan dissenting); 8 WiOMORE, EVIDENCE § 2360 (3d ed. 1940).
8 0 Kuh, supra note 14, at 1115 n. 56.
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inspect them prior to trial without some "particularized need ...for
the minutes which outweighs the policy of secrecy. '"' Such a particularized
need is not required for the accused to obtain public records that are intro-
duced before the grand jury such as arrest records, property books, etc.82
The grand jury8" is free from most of the constitutional restraints
imposed on other institutions involved in the criminal justice system.8'
The witness has no sixth amendment right to counsel, 5 although he may
have counsel outside the jury room with whom he can consult.8" Only
one witness who appeared before our grand jury appeared with retained
counsel who remained outside the jury room, and was not actually consulted
by his client during the taking of testimony.
The grand jury is not bound by normal evidentiary rules and may hear
evidence inadmissible at trial because obtained in violation of the fourth
amendment.8 7 It may return indictment based on hearsay." Indeed, In
Costello v. United States,"8 the only evidence presented the grand jury on
which it returned an indictment was hearsay. Nonetheless, the Court upheld
the validity of the indictment, observing that the grand jury could act on
81State v. Laskey, 21 Ohio St. 2d 187, 191, 257 N.E.2d 65 (1970). See also M. FRANKEL
& G. NATFAUm, THE GRAND JURY: AN INSTITUniON ON TmAL 117-138 (1977).
82The distinction between persons and inanimate objects is well recognized in the law.
See note 56, supra. Naturally the testimony concerning the public record would be covered
by the rule. See In re Klausmeyer, 24 Ohio St. 2d 143, 146, 265 N.E.2d 275 (1970). An
interesting parallel exists with the Court's interpretation of the fifth amendment's privilege
against self-incrimination as not covering real evidence, but only testimonial or communicative
utterances. Under this rationale the fifth amendment does not protect an individual from
compulsory blood tests, Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966); use of the clothing
of the defendant, Warden v. Hayden 387 U.S. 294 (1967); or compulsory appearance in
a lineup. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
83 Grand jury proceedings constitute the one stage of the criminal justice process that
has escaped the due process scrutiny to which other aspects of the system have been sub-
jected during the past two decades. 64 A.B.A.J. 337. The American Bar Association has
recommended sweeping changes in grand jury procedures. Among changes advocated are:
(1) the allowance of counsel inside the grand jury room;
(2) the recording of all grand jury proceedings, except the jurors' deliberations; and
(3) the granting of transactional rather than "use" immunity.
Id. at 338.
84State grand juries are not even bound by federal court interpretation of the grand
jury institution since the grand jury guarantee of the fifth amendment of the United States
Constitution is not applicable to the states. Beck v. Washingon, 369 U.S. 541 (1962);
Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 538 (1884); Rowan v. State, 30 Wis. 129 (1872).
85See In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330 (1957). Compare Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411
(1969) with Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420 (1960).
86See People v. Ianniello, 21 N.Y.2d 418, 288 N.Y.S. 2d 462, 235 N.E.2d 439 (1968).
87 United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974). See United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S.
1 (1972). Federal grand juries cannot hear evidence obtained by illegal electronic sur-
veillance, but the basis for the exclusion is statutory, not constitutional. Gelbard v. United
States, 408 U.S. 41 (1972). See also Thompson, The Fourth Amendment Function of the
Grand Jury, 37 Omo ST. L.J. 727 (1976).
88 Elder, supra note 39, at 286-87.
89 350 U.S. 359 (1959).
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whatever evidence it deemed "satisfactory."9 The Court has approved the
grand jury acting on the basis of "tips, rumors, evidence proferred by the
prosecutor, or the personal knowledge of the grand jurors."91 The Court
justifies the lack of evidentiary limitations as necessary to effectuate the
grand jury's role.92
During our term no person was indicted on the basis of inadmissible
hearsay. We required each element of the crime to be substantiated by
competent credible evidence. That is not to say that we did not have wit-
nesses every day who gratuitously offered blatant hearsay evidence. Fre-
quently, in a substantial number of cases the prosecutor subpoenaed de-
tectives who appeared with no personal knowledge of the case. These de-
tectives would read from the reports until asked if they had any personal
knowledge of the case. If they did not, and there was no other basis for
their testimony, they were excused. This is apparently not an uncommon
procedure:
In response to a question by Judge Friedman as to whether there was
any evidence the grand juries in Cuyahoga County indicted based
on hearsay evidence, Mr. Knowling responded that Mr. Douglas, a
past grand jury foreman, earlier told the committee of the practice
of police departments utilizing "readers" to read the reports of other
police officers not present.... Mr. Rowell added that this is a common
practice in the Cleveland Police Department. 3
Often police officers would look at the prosecutor and ask if he wanted the
accused's criminal record, which was in the officer's hand. Of course, such
comments were prejudicial and immaterial, except in cases where a prior
conviction was an aggravating element elevating a lesser to a greater offense
(such as petty to grand theft). Again, this appears to be a common practice
with Cuyahoga County grand juries."
The grand jury's ultimate power is that of returning a presentment or,
with the prosecutor's concurrence, an indictment. Surprisingly, there is no
definitive statement of the standard for determining if the evidence is
90 350 U.S. at 362. The rule is the same in Ohio. "We must not forget that grand juries
may return indictments based wholly upon facts within their own knowledge and to support
which not a single witness has been called or sworn." State v. Woolard, 12 Nisi Prius &
Gen. T. Rep. 395, 398 (Licking Cty. 1910).
91 Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 701 (1972), quoted in United States v. Calandra,
414 U.S. 338, 344 (1974). The Court earlier had indicated that a grand jury can return
indictments "based solely on their own knowledge of the particular offenses." McCrain v.
Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 157 (1927).
92 "Any holding that would saddle a grand jury with minitrials and preliminary showings
would assuredly impede its investigation and frustrate the public's interest in the fair and
expeditious administration of the criminal laws." 410 U.S. at 17.
93 See supra note 73, at 42.
94 ld. at 3 1. When questions about the effect of the prior record on his voting an indictment
one former foreman stated that it "gives you a picture of whether or not this fellow, having
committed and been sentenced before, might have returned on the same thing." Id. at 15.
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sufficient to justify an indictment-the matter is just left to the grand jury's
discretion.9" The tests proposed range from
the function of the grand jury is merely to say whether from the
evidence for the prosecution (at which alone they look) there is
probable cause of suspicion"
to
[i]n passing upon the question of whether or not a bill of indictment
shall be returned, it is the duty of the grand jury to so return if the
guilt of the defendant is established beyond a reasonable doubt.97
Given the enormous and amorphous power of the grand jury, it is
not surprising to learn that witnesses often feel helpless when appearing
to testify.
The witness must submit to virtually unlimited grand jury questioning
with respect to criminal matters, his constitutional rights endangered,
without the benefit of counsel. Our society has no comparable in-
stitution which sanctions such interrogations of a person "legally"
denied counsel. 8
Nor is it surprising to hear frequent criticisms of the abuse of grand jury
power, like that in 1974 of Los Angeles Police Chief Edward Davis:
Indictments are being generated, and (sic) in my opinion, under an
unconstitutional law that is in effect a 20th-century legal rack and
screw. Grand juries can and do listen to illegal evidence, and when
my men were put through the federal grand juries in this city, it was
the worst star chamber session you ever saw. Multiple prosecutors
scattering themselves through the jury, throwing questions from left
field and right field, where if it wasn't like the Spanish Inquisition, at
least it was like the day when police with rubber hoses and spotlights in
the faces of suspects got the truth out of them in that fashion. 9
IV. WEAKNESSES AND DISABILITIES
It is clear that some of the above-noted powers are de facto non-
existent. For example, the power to issue subpoenas to compel witnesses
to appear,' 0 is of little use. First, without an investigative staff,' there
9b See State v. Price, 101 Ohio St. 50, 55 (1920). See also Alexander & Portment, Grand
Jury Indictment versus Prosecution by Information-An Equal Protection-Due Process Issue,
25 HASTINGS L.J. 997 (1974).
96See HOLDSWORTH, supra note 12, at 321.
97 12 Nisi Prius & Gen. T. Rep. at 398.
98 Boudin, The Federal Grand Jury, 61 GEORGET. L.J. 1,3 (1972).
99 See Solowey, supra note 28, at 34.
100 Omo REv. CoDi ANNm. § 2939.12 (Page 1975).
101 "In our vast urban society, jurors have no intimate knowledge of the goings-on within
the community. They must depend, therefore, upon the facts and knowledge brought
before them from extrinsic sources. They have no investigative skills or resources of their
own and thus the task of gathering facts must be performed for them by the professional
investigative agencies at their disposal-law enforcement agencies." Campbell, Eliminate
the Grand Jury, 64 J. CiM. L. & CUMUTOLOGY 174, 178 (1973). See also Y. KAMIsAR,
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is no way to exercise this power with any degree of authority or rationality.
Second, the theory is not consonant with fact. Thus, when the Clerk's
Office was asked to issue a subpoena, the response was to suggest that the
grand jury see the prosecutor. Throughout our term, the grand jury relied
on the Prosecutor's Office to issue subpoenas. The grand jury did not
issue a single subpoena.
Ohio Rules of Criminal Procedure 6(D) (E) appear to authorize
recording of the proceedings before the grand jury. However, without
the agreement of the prosecutor it appears almost impossible to obtain
a court reporter to transcribe the testimony.' And even if a court reporter
transcribes the testimony, it is not available for the use of the grand jury,
only the prosecutor.'
The most glaring defect is the lack of any training program for the
jurors. The grand jurors as laymen cannot comprehend the nuances of
evidence, criminal, and constitutional law. How is a layman to understand
that a statement of a co-conspirator, although hearsay, is admissible only
if there is evidence aliunde establishing the conspiracy, and the hearsay
is not devastating or critical to the defense?.0 . This is not merely hypothetical,
since that very issue arose during our term.
Further, without an understanding of its power, how can the grand
jury really assert itself?'.' The training generally offered-
Once assembled the jurors are usually treated to a rather lofty explan-
ation of the enormity and significance of their task by the presiding
judge of the particular jurisdiction. The formality of apprising them
W. LAFAvE & J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 879 n.g (4th ed. 1974). "The
grand jury should be provided with special independent counsel for advice on the myriad
of legal matters that confront it." Note, The Grand Jury, 27 CASE W.R.L. REV. 580, 600
(1977).
102 One witness' testimony was transcribed because the prosecutor had not obtained a prior
statement from the witness. The grand jury did itself electronically record the testimony of
several witnesses, but the practice was discontinued when it became apparent that the
prosecutor planned to rely on statements taken from the witnesses in his office rather
than testimony before the grand jury.
103 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2939.11 (Page 1975). This provision seems a rather clear
manifestation of legislative intent to make the grand jury subordinate to the prosecutor.
0 4 See Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970). Jurors' ignorance of the law has often been
cited as one basis for abolition of the institution. See R. YOUNGER, supra note 10, at
66. Indeed, the grand jurors have been characterized as providing an "unfailing supply of
ignorance." Id. at 141.
105 The improper exercise of power is also a product or lack of adequate training. "The
continued appearance of [invalid jury] reports might be attributable to the common belief
among lay jurors, uninstructed in law, that they are a power unto themselves and can
peer into any matter that their civic consciences indicate needs investigation." Kuh, supra
note 14, at 1105. See also Simington v. Shimp, 60 Ohio App. 2d 410 (1979); McGaughey,
supra note 43, at 726.
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concerning their powers and obligations having been disposed of, the
jurors are then dispatched to commence their duties.'
The lack of training is reported in the literature concerning grand juries
generally,0 7 in Ohio,0 8 and in Cuyahoga County,' In some areas of the
country, grand juries are given briefings, booklets, and orientation sess-
ions."' But, anyone who has studied law knows how difficult it is to "think
like a lawyer," which is the stance required to interpret the material with
which the grand jury must work. For a layman, attempting to maintain that
posture is like bending over backward-a very difficult position to hold
for very long. Many grand jurors expect the foreman to provide the requisite
insight. But where he too is a layman, he probably ends up feeling like
one former foreman who admitted:
I didn't know any more about what we were supposed to be doing
than anybody else, but everyone kept asking me, "Can we do this?
Are we supposed to do that?" I finally got so I really studied our
[grand jury] handbook every night, and I used to stop by the D.A.'s
office [actually the office of Assistant District Attorney in charge of
the Grand Jury Division] every now and then and asked them for
advice. In time I was able to keep one step ahead of the other grand
jurors, and I guess that way I earned some of their respect as a
leader. But most of the time I didn't know about what was coming
106 Campbell, supra note 101, at 177. Similar commentaries appear throughout the literature.
Once selected, grand juries are given little preparation, training or briefing for their
task. Beyond the prepared speech that the impaneling judge delivers to newly im-
panelled jurors, there are no further informational sessions to explain the exact
nature of jurors' functions; the nature, scope and limitations of their powers; their
relationship with the other entities in the criminal justice system, such as the district
attorney, the attorney general, the superior court, and the other law enforcement
agencies; their relationship with county governmental agencies, or, most importantly,
the law's intent that the grand jury be an autonomous body, free of any outside
influences.
Bickner, supra note 43, at 734-35.
107 See R. YOUNGER, supra note 10, at 244; Bickner, supra note 43, at 734-35; Calkins,
Grand Jury Secrecy, 63 MICH. L. REv. 455 (1965); Campbell, supra note 101, at 177;
Carp, The Harris County Grand Jury-A Case Study, 12 HOUSTON L. REV. 90, 118 (1974);
Fine, FEDERAL GRAND JURY INVESTIGATION OF POLmcAL DISSIDENTS, 7 HIIv. Civ. RIGHTS-
Civ. Lm. L. REV. 432, 442 (1972).
108 See especially Lee, supra note 5.
109 See supra note 73, at 12, 31, 63. "Mr. Allerton (former foreman, Cuyahoga County
Grand Jury) noted that none of the grand jurors, including himself, received any meaningful
amount of education or orientation at the outset of their terms in regard to the prospective
performance of their duties." Id. at 31. See also Braun, The Grand Jury-Spirit of the
Community? 15 ARIz. L. REV. 893 (1973).
1101n San Diego the jurors are given a booklet entitled, "The San Diego County Grand
Jury Guide." Unfortunately even after reading the booklet most jurors are "confused and
admit they don't understand the role of the grand jury and the standards to use for in-
dictments." Report of the Grand Jury Committee, San Diego County Bar Association, 9
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 145, 155 (1972). In Harris County, which has Houston as its major
city, grand jurors, prior to hearing cases, attend a seminar offered by police and sheriff's
department officials, receive two instructional booklets (one written by the district attorney,
the other by the Harris County Grand Jury Association), and an intensive "give and take"
discussion session with a member of the district attorney's staff. Carp, supra note 107, at 97.
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off any more than they did, and I doubt whether I fooled them very
much.""
When the lack of training is combined with a workload of almost
one thousand cases a term,"' with five to six minutes allotted per witness," 3
the prosecutor pressing the grand jury to move it along,"' and the increasing
complexity of the law,"' it is surprising grand juries do as well as they do
-which, unfortunately is not very good at all.
V. EVALUATION
Recalling that the primary function of the grand jury is to filter out
of the system those individuals who ought not be prosecuted, the statistics
provide the most telling indictment of all--of those indicted who go to
trial less than 40% are convicted."'
It is really indisputable that the grand jury is not an effective filtering
or screening device. Students of the grand jury uniformly recognize that
"'1 Carp, supra note 107, at 108.
112 Our grand jury heard 841 cases, involving 1005 defendants. The cases, by indictment,
are as follows:
Abduction 2 Attempted Kidnapping 2
Attempted Abduction 1 Larceny by Trick 5
Aggravated Assault 1 Aggravated Menacing 4
Arson 2 Misuse of Credit Card 3
Aggravated Arson 5 Murder 2
Breaking and Entering 104 Aggravated Murder with Specification 1
Attempt Breaking and Entering 3 Attempt Murder 1
Bribery 1 Neglect 1
Burglary 2 Non-Support of Dependents 3
Aggravated Burglary 66 Obstructing Justice 2
Attempted Burglary 3 Obtain Money with forged Title 1
Carrying Concealed Weapons 60 Operating Motor Vehicle without
Child Stealing 3 the Owner's Consent 1
Corruption of a Minor 2 Passing Bad Check 10
Defrauding Innkeeper 1 Poor Relief Fraud 23
Drug Law 39 Possession Criminal Tools 9
Escape 6 Promoting Prostitution 3
Failure to Appear 47 Rape 31
Felonious Assault 57 Attempt Rape 2
Forgery 40 Receiving Stolen Property 66
Grand Theft 111 Receiving Stolen Property (MV) 6
Grand Theft Motor Vehicle 20 Robbery 25
Grand Theft Poor Relief Fraud 47 Aggravated Robbery 82
Gross Sexual Imposition 4 Sexual Battery 1
Having Weapon While Theft I
under Disability 6 Theft in Office 3
Intimidation I Unlawful Use of Vehicle I
Intimidating Witness 1 Vandalism 5
Kidnapping 12
113 See supra note 73, at 14. This is consistent with other reports. See also Carp, supra note
107, at 101.
114 Witnesses, of course, sometimes get cranky, and detectives on occasion complained that
we were too slow.
115 See Note, Evaluating the Grand Jury's Role in a Dual System of Prosecution: An Iowa
Case Study, 57 IowA L. Rav. 1354-55 (1972).
116 Supra note 73, at 14, 37.
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this is so."' Further, it is apparent that there is no way for the grand jury
as currently conceived to ever screen cases fairly and justly. Our system
of justice is based on the effective operation of the adversary process. The
adversary system serves multiple ends, but perhaps most significant is that
when operating properly it assures the public and litigants that the legal
process is just and fair and thus maintains the confidence of the public
in legal institutions. For many students of the law, challenge to government
action is basic to the system, especially where criminal justice is involved.
The essence of the adversary system is challenge. The survival of our
system of criminal justice and the value it advances depends upon the
constant, searching, and creative questioning of official decisions and
assertions of authority at all stages of the process." 8
But proceedings before the grand jury are, as we have seen, not adversarial
in nature."' There is no lawyer to challenge the state's case or to point
up inconsistencies in the witnesses' testimony. 2 What the United States
Supreme Court said about the defendant's need for counsel is equally
applicable, mutatis mutandis, to the layman grand juror's need for counsel:
Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes
no skill in the science of the law. If charged with crime, he is in-
capable, generally, of determining for himself whether the indictment
is good or bad. He is unfamiliar with the rules of evidence. Left without
the aid of counsel he may be put on trial without a proper charge,
and convicted upon incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to
the issue or otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and knowl-
edge adequately to prepare his defense, even though he has a perfect
one. He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step of the
117See Morse, supra note 12, at 313; Carp, supra note 107, at 118; supra note 73
at 27-28, 37, 61. See also Cleveland Plain Dealer, Dec. 25, 1978, § B, at 2. "Court clerk's
figures show that, in recent years, grand jurors [in Cuyahoga County] indicted be-
tween ninety-one and ninety-seven percent of the suspects whose cases they heard . . . Only
one in five persons processed through the court was convicted of the charges leveled against
him."
I's Allen, REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE ON POVERTY AND THE AD-
MINISTRATION OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 11 (1963).
119 See Note, The Grand Jury, supra note 101, at 580:
The grand jury in practice, hears only cases the prosecutor decides to present to it; it
often hears only the prosecutor's version of the case; the prosecutor generally selects
and examines the grand jury's witnesses; the accused is not allowed to be present or
heard unless called as a witness; the accused is not represented by counsel; and the
grand jury is composed of laymen who are likely to show considerable defference to
the prosecutor's expertise.
120 "The prosecutor should disclose to the grand jury any evidence which he knows will
tend to negate guilt." A.B.A. STANDARDS, THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 316(b) (1971).
Similarly, the A.B.A. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY E.C. 7-13 (1975) states:
"The responsibility of a public prosecutor differs from that of the usual advocate; his
duty is to seek justice, not merely to convict." The California Supreme Court held in
Johnson v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d 248, 124 Cal. Rpt. 32, 539 P.2d 792 (1975)
that the prosecutor has a clear duty to apprise the grand jury of evidence tending
to negate the guilt of the suspect. See also Note, The Prosecutor's Duty to Present
Exculpatory Evidence to an Indicting Grand Jury, 75 MICH. L. Rv. 1514 (1977).
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proceedings against him. Without it, though he be not guilty, he faces
the danger of conviction because he does not know how to establish
his innocence.' 2 '
Trying to plug the non-adversarial indictment of a grand jury into the
adversarial system is akin to the square peg in a round hole trick. Of course,
some will try the impossible.
Without counsel and training, the grand jury naturally relies on the
prosecutor-who constitutes one-half of the adversarial equation. This
reliance is well established, and accounts for the low percentage of no-
bills. 2 The National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice concludes:
The Grand Jury, which indicts almost all cases presented to it, has a
negligible effect--other than delay--on the criminal process. It seems
most reasonable to avoid using the Grand Jury except in cases where
a community voice is needed in a troublesome or notorious case.
In most cities where the grand jury is used it eliminates fewer than
twenty percent of the cases it receives. In Cleveland, Ohio, the figure
is seven percent; in the District of Columbia, twenty percent; and in
Philadelphia, Pa., two to three percent. 22
The extent to which the proceedings are skewed in favor of the state
with only the prosecutor presenting the case is manifest when one considers
merely the effect on the witnesses' testimony of the way in which the
questions are framed. In one study it was demonstrated that when witnesses
were asked to estimate the speed of a car involved in an accident they had
witnessed, ceteris paribus, the verb used in asking the question significantly
changed the response. Indeed, twice as many witnesses recalled seeing broken
glass at the scene of the accident when asked in terms of "smashed" as
opposed to "hit."'2 " Many commentators have recognized the tendency
of the grand jury to merely "rubber stamp" the findings of the prosecutor.'
122 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932).
122 Our grand jury heard 841 cases and returned 53 no-bills (6.3%).
123 Allen, supra note 118, at 75.
124 See E. Loftus, Reconstructing Memory: The Incredible Eyewitness, 8 PSYCHOLOGY TODAY
116 (Dec. 1974).
"15 Antell, The Modern Grand Jury: Benighted Supergovernment, 51 A.B.A.J. 153 (1965).
[W]hen a case is brought into the grand jury room the prevailing feeling is that the
prosecutor wouldn't bring it there if he didn't think he could get a conviction. According-
ly, it follows in nearly all cases that unless the prosecutor does something forceful about
it indictments are normally returned by the grand jury.
Id.
Protection of the citizen against hasty and unfounded prosecutions, the advantage claimed
for the requirement of an indictment in case of all infamous crimes, is more theoretical
than real in the urban community of today. With the enormous lists of arrests in
our large cities there is no guaranty against hasty or oppressive prosecutions in a body
which can give but little time to the general run of cases and must depend on the
prosecuting attorney for its information as to facts. Under such circumstances it must
be a very weak case which can not be presented so as to procure an indictment.
Where the number of prosecutions is large, it is hard for the grand jury in any ordi-
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Ironically, the grand jury thus no longer serves the role constitutional
drafters envisioned when the guarantee was placed in the Bill of Rights,
but instead has reverted to its original role as an arm of the executive.
As Justice Douglas has observed: "It is indeed, common knowledge that
the grand jury, having been conceived as a bulwark between the citizen
and the Government, is now a tool of the Executive.""12
The bottom line is then that although the prosecutor makes the decision
to go forward in a case, he is able to shift the apparent responsibility to the
grand jury, hiding behind its secrecy-inimicable to the interests of that
institution--often making the grand jury the scapegoat for an unpopular
decision either to indict or not to indict.2 7 Prosecutors are generally willing
to admit the crucial import of the decision to charge,"2 8 but are unwilling to
admit that they, in fact, do make that determination. As one county prose-
cutor puts it: "[Ciharging, in great measure, is playing god . . . and I
do not particularly want to play god."'29 Interestingly, he adds that if
there is a problem of overcharging then "the grand jury is responsible, not
this office,""' and "when it [overcharging?] does occur 'it is a charge leveled
to suit a purpose.' "'3'
The grand jury is, therefore, naturally the prosecutor's darling. Not
nary case to get at other facts than those presented to them, or even to know that
it is authorized to get at them. It is unusual for grand juries to go into a thorough,
independent investigation of any ordinary case unless the prosecutor is willing. If the
work of sifting were done as it should be by proper criminal investigation at the
outset and by the prosecuting attorney, the grand jury could be given a basis for
doing its work thoroughly and well. But the loose methods of investigation and sifting,
which prevail generally in large cities, cause that work to be mechanical and per-
functory, except in a small number of sensational or unusual cases.
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT REPORT ON PROSECUTION
36 (1931). (Hereinafter referred to as WICKERSHAM REPORT). See also Note, Removing
Politics from the Justice Department: Constitutional Problems with Institutional Reform,
N.Y.U.L. REv. (1975); Tuerkheimer, The Executive Investigates Itself, 65 CALIF. L. REV.
(1977).
126 United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19,23 (1973) (Justice Douglas dissenting.) The Supreme
Court has admitted that the "grand jury may not always serve its historic role as a pro-
tecting bulwark standing solidly between the ordinary citizen and an overzealous prosecutor."
Dionisio, 410 U.S. at 17. See also Boudin, supra note 98, at 35.
127 See Tigar & Levy, Grand Jury as the New Inquisition, 50 MICH. STATE B.J. 693 (1971);
R. YOUNGER, supra note 10, at 146.
128 M. FREEDMAN, supra note 36, at 85. See also Lee, supra note 5, at 338-344 (1979).
"i' See supra note 73, at 17. The petit jury has long served a similar role in insulating the
judge from responsibility. However, there is an enormous difference in that the petit jury does
not rubber stamp the decision of the judge or prosecutor. Further, the jury, except in
Maryland, only determines questions of fact, not law, with extensive instruction from the
judge concerning the law relevant to the case.
130 Id.
11 Id. See also Cleveland Plain Dealer, supra note 117, at § 8 at 2.
[The] County Prosecutor . . . said charges of over indictment amount to a "smoke
screen" to demean the system for the benefit of defense lawyers . . . . Defense law-
yers argue that plea bargaining would be unnecessary if the grand jury did not over
indict.
Summer, 19791
25
Lewis: The Grand Jury
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1980
AKRON LAW REVIEW
only can the prosecutor avoid responsibility for his determination of whether
to go forward with a case, but the grand jury provides him with unilateral
pretrial discovery, 1 3 a chance to test his evidence,133 and where public
officials are prosecuted, by "shifting to the grand jury the responsibility for
the decision whether to allow such a prosecution to go to trial, the county
attorney may be able to protect his working relationship with other public
officials and, if the prosecution is ultimately unsuccessful, may be able
to avoid the potentially adverse political consequences of the decision
to prosecute. ' 13 ' And where there are two or more grand juries impanelled
contemporaneously, the prosecutor is in an even better position since he
can opt for the more acquiescent panel. 3
There is a phenomenol cost attached to maintaining the grand jury
system. First and foremost is the charging of more innocent persons under
the indictment as opposed to information system.' Professor Morse, after
extensive research, concluded that "a greater number of innocent men
132 See Fine, supra note 107, at 455. See also Newman, The Suspect and the Grand Jury:
A Need for Constitutional Protection, 11 U. RicH. L. REv. 119 (1978). A prosecutor cannot
however, use the grand jury as a form of pre-trial discovery once a defendant has been
secretly indicted. The Sixth Circuit held in United States v. Doss, 563 F.2d 265 (1977):
Where a substantial purpose of calling an indicted defendant before a grand jury is
to question him secretly and without his being informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation about a crime for which he stands already indicted, the proceeding is
an abuse of process which violates both the Right To Counsel provision of the sixth
amendment and Due Process Clause of the fifth amendment. Indictments for perjurious
answers given in such a proceeding must be quashed because the proceeding itself
is void.
133 See Note, Evaluating the Grand Jury's Role in a Dual System of Prosecution: An Iowa
Case Study, supra note 115, at 1372; Lee, supra note 5, at 349 n. 56.
Prosecutor: I use them as a sounding board. I present my evidence in the same man-
ner as it were a trial. I know their reactions will be similar to a petit jury. They often
ask questions I never think of.
Id.
234 See Note, Evaluating the Grand Jury's Role in a Dual System of Prosecution: An Iowa
Case Study, supra note 115, at 1373. "If the county attorney alone makes the decision to
prosecute a fellow public official by information and the prosecution is unsuccessful, it
may appear to the public that he was engaging in a 'witch hunt.'" Id. Other prosecutorial
advantages also are apparent. "The institution enables the prosecutor to conduct an investi-
gation with the power to subpoena witnesses, examine them under oath, preserve their
testimony on record, and question a potential defendant without his attorney being present.
Moreover, the grand jury enables the prosecutor to engage in wide ranging investigations
seeking a wrong, rather than beginning with the commission of a crime and investigating
from that point." L. KATZ, L. LrrwIN & R. BAMBERGER, JUSTICE IS THE CRIME: PRaTIAL
DELAY IN FELONY CASES 122 (1972).
'35See supra note 73, at 32-33. At one of our sessions one prosecutor was so upset at
our demand for better evidence that he actually jumped up and down in anger. "[A]
phenomenon that may well occur in Harris County is for the district attorney to 'size up'
the grand juries during their first several working sessions and then to present cases to
the grand jury that is most likely to act in accordance with the district attorney's wishes.
To what extent this occurs is unknown, but that it does occur to some degree is beyond
doubt." Carp, supra note 107, at 118.
136 Where the information approach is used there are proportionately more guilty pleas
and a higher rate of conviction of defendants who go to trial. See Morse, supra note 12, at
313-14,
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are indicted under the grand jury system than are prosecuted under the
information system, and further . . . defendants more often insist on
trial under the indictment method than under the information method."'' 7
The concomitant cost to the defendant of delay necessarily accompanying
the inefficiency of the indictment system means he must remain under
the cloud of criminal charges (often in a miserable jail) for a longer
period of time. From the state's viewpoint the delay and inefficiency means
greater cost, both in dollars and energy." 8 Some of the best, or worst
(depending on who you ask), assistant prosecutors must be assigned to
the role of grand jury ventriloquist and are, therefore, unavailable to try
cases. Dean Miller sums up the matter of costs:
When a guilty man pleads guilty, following an arraignment upon an
information, the cost is a minimum one. When the same man lives
at the expense of the county for a month or two, receives the attention
of a grand jury and a prosecuting attorney for a day or two, stands
trial in the district court for a day or two or three more and finally
arrives at the same point at which he would willingly have gone free
of charge two or three months before, the expense to the county is
a maximum one; and in addition twenty-three citizens have donated
their valuable services in grand jury service, more than a dozen
more for trial service, and many others have waited their turns
as witnesses. In addition to the per diem and expenses of the jurors,
consideration should be given to the salaries and expenses of addi-
tional judges, assistant prosecuting attorneys, jailers, and court at-
taches who must be provided to care for the increased work which the
grand jury entails. If the result of the delay is an acquittal or a dis-
agreement, then we have a miscarriage of justice to figure in the total
cost also."3 9
137 Id. at 139.
138 See Campbell, supra note 101, at 180; Molely, The Initiation of Criminal Prosecutions
by Indictment or Information, 29 MICH. L. REV. 403 (1931); Note, Evaluating the Grand
Jury's Role in a Dual System of Prosecution: An Iowa Case Study, supra note 115, at
1359. The Wickersham Committee's recommendation of abolition of the grand jury was
primarily based on the inefficiency of the indictment approach. See WICKERSHAM REPORT,
supra note 125, at 34-37.
139 Miller, Informations or Indictments in Felony Cases, 8 MINN. L. REv. 379, 387-388
(1924). There is also the deleterious effect of delay on witnesses' recollections. See Morse,
supra note 12, at 256. And for society, delay and inefficiency in the criminal justice system
reduces the effectiveness of its "war on crime." Senator Edward Kennedy made the point
quite eloquently in an appearance before the Chicago Crime Commission:
Today, courts and prosecutors in every major city in the nation are beset with ex-
panding dockets and shrinking budgets. They cannot possibly cope with crime and
the mushrooming caseload waiting to be tried.
The result in all to many cases is that "crime does pay." Even if the policeman on the
beat catches up with you, the courts will let you go. Of the 730,000 adult felony
arrests in New York in the past decade, only thirty-one percent were indicted; of
those indicted, only thirty-three percent were convicted; and of those convicted, only
thirty-eight percent were sentenced to jail. You do the arithmetic. The extraordinary
result is that ninety-seven percent of all adults actually arrested for a felony in New
York were filtered through the law enforcement system and escaped a prison term.
Or take Los Angeles. During 1972, only six percent of those charged with burglary;
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And there is the further cost of abuse when the darling becomes the "twin
sister of the inquisition "" and is used to harass unpopular individuals and
groups.'' Of course, all this is not new or obscure. One feels in recounting
the state of the grand jury a bit like the child exclaiming, "but the King
doesn't have on any clothes." Or, in citing studies to support the obvious
like using a sledgehammer to open peanuts. But the incredible fact is that
the grand jury persists in Ohio with no benefits to the accused and at great
cost to him and society.' Students of the criminal justice system agree
that the accused and society are better served by an information approach
coupled with the requirement of a prior preliminary hearing.' Numerous
critics have recommended the abolition of the grand jury indictment re-
quirement in Ohio, including Roscoe Pound and Felix Frankfurter,'" the
Ohio Bar Association,' and the Greater Cleveland Bar Association.' "
who had a serious prior record, were actually sent to prison.
The reason for these astounding figures has almost nothing to do with noble principles
like the presumption of innocence or noble goals like the rehabilitation of offenders.
The reason is court congestion. In virtually every state and local jurisdiction, the
ideal of judicial wisdom and deliberation is a romantic relic of the past. Courts today
are dispensing hectic stopwatch justice on overloaded assembly lines. The proceedings
involve little nobility or solemnity. Defendants are processed at breakneck speed through
a system where bargains must be offered at every turn if the system is to stay afloat
-what bail can be agreed to, what hearing can be postponed, what charge can be
dismissed, what plea bargain can be made, what sentence can be suspended? The
most frequent remedy used by reluctant judges and prosecutors to ease the pressure of
their caseload is to make the problem go away by allowing the offender to "cop a plea"
and return to circulation.
This is law without order, crime without punishment. It demonstrates why crime too
often pays today. "Revolving door" justice-the need to reduce crowded dockets-
persuades the criminal that his chances of actually being caught, tried, convicted and
jailed are so slim as to be nonexistent. Effective crime control requires much more
than that. The vast majority of criminals are rational. They play the odds. Effective de-
terrence requires that the odds must be reduced. A prospective criminal must believe
that if he is caught, the chances are high that he will be swiftly and surely punished.
Reprinted in 121 CONG. REc. No. 159, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., October 30, 1975.
140 R. YOUNGER, supra note 10, at 144.
'4' For examples see L. CLARK, supra note 65, at 11, 19, 22, 38-44, 45-62; Goodell, Where
Did the Grand Jury Go? 246 HARPER'S No. 1476, May 1973, at 14. See also note 99 and
accompanying text, supra.
142 See KATZ, LITWIN & BAMBERGER, supra note 134, at 17. Contra. Lee, supra note 5, at 352.
'4- Blackstone long ago noted that the accused has no cause to complain when an infor-
mation rather than indictment is used where the "same notice was given, the same process
was issued, the same pleas were allowed, the same trial by jury was had, the same judg-
ment was given by the same judges, as if the prosecution had originally been by indictment."
4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 310. True then and true now. On the federal pre-
liminary hearing see 18 U.S.C. § 3060.
144 After completing a survey of the criminal justice system in Cleveland, Pound and
Frankfurter concluded that the grand jury was "inefficient" and "unnecessary." See R.
POUND & F. FRANKFURTER, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN CLEVELAND 176, 211-12, 248 (1922).
145It was in 1892 that the Ohio Bar Association moved to abolish the grand jury to
simplify criminal procedure. See R. YOUNGER, supra note 10, at 141.
146 Bernard Stuplinski chaired the committee that conducted the study that produced the
recommendation for abolition of the grand jury and substitution of information and a
mandatory preliminary hearing. See supra note 73, at 13-14. If abolition was not forth-
roming the committee recommended the following: "First, all grand jury proceedings, with
(Vol. 13:1
28
Akron Law Review, Vol. 13 [1980], Iss. 1, Art. 3
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol13/iss1/3
The requirement of a grand jury indictment was actually eliminated in
the Ohio Constitution of 1872,'" but unfortunately, the people rejected
the new constitution.' 8 As is commonly known, England, the birthplace of
the grand jury, virtually abolished the institution in 1933,'° and most
states have also eliminated it.' Alfred S. Julien, Chairman of American
Trial Lawyers Board of Editors, thoughtfully comments:
THE GRAND JURY SYSTEM IS AN ABOMINATION. IT HAS
OUTLIVED ITS USEFULNESS. IT SERVES NO PURPOSE. IT
SHOULD BE ABOLISHED.
When we consider how many futile reform proposals assail the ad-
ministration of justice, sponsored by so many disappointed lawyers,
now professors, or would-be lawyers, now journalists, we wonder why
this anachronism escapes real reform. 5'
One suspects that it persists in large measure by virtue of inertia, the
normalization of the actual, and the popular myth of the institution as a
bulwark of protection for individual rights. The arguments usually advanced
in support of retention are not very persuasive. These include the fear that
elimination would enhance the bureaucratic power of prosecutors and
judges with exacerbation of establishment "hardening of the categories."1"'
The ready answer is that the power already exists, but is merely camou-
flaged. To make visible the decision process and who bears the responsi-
bility would actually serve as a check on arbitrary exercise of discretion.
"We have long learned in our profession: Responsibility begets care!"''
the exception of the actual voting, should be recorded. Second, the accused, at his request,
should be afforded an opportunity to appear before the grand jury. Finally, the pre-
liminary hearing should be mandatory unless waived by the accused." Id. at 14.
'4' See R. YOUNGER, supra note 10, at 151.
148 Id. See also PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE THIRD CONSTrrTUONAL CONVENTION OF
Omo 1872, 113, 191 (Cleveland 1873-74).
'4 See Administration of Justice (Misc. Provisions) Act. 1933, 23 & 24 Geo. 5, c. 36, § 13
The Criminal Justice Act, 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c.58, § 83, sched. 10, pt. I.
150 See supra note 73, at 81. The Twenty-Seven states provide for prosecution of felonies
by information or by indictment at the option of the prosecutor. See also Steele, Right to
Counsel at the Grand Jury Stage of Criminal Proceedings, 36 Mo. L. REv. 193 (1971);
Federal Grand Jury; Hearings before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Citizenship, and In-
ternational Law of the Comm. on the Judiciary on H.J. Res. 46 H.R. 1277 and Related Bills,
94th Cong. 2d Sess. 716-17 (1976).
151 Julien, The Gand Jury: Necessary or Decadent? 8 TRIAL 15 (Jan.-Feb. 1972). Of course,
prosecutors are often "adament in their desire to preserve the grand jury." KATZ, LrrwiN
& BAMBERGER, supra note 134, at 122. See also Lee, supra note 5, at 346-49.
152 See Kuh, supra note 14, at 3; Morse, supra note 12, at 353-54; R. YOUNGER, supra
note 10, at 188.
153 Julien, supra note 151, at 15. The ABA Standards set forth some sensible guidelines for
exercise of prosecutorial discretion:
3.9 Discretion in the charging decision.
(a) It is unprofessional conduct for a prosecutor to institute or cause to be instituted
criminal charges when he knows that the charges are not supported by probable
cause.
(b) The prosecutor is not obliged to present all charges which the evidence might
T"nE GRAND JURY~Summer, 1979]
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A second argument adduced in support of grand jury retention suggests that
regardless of its faults in carrying out the indicting function, it excels in
investigating official misconduct. Past examples of grand jury successes are
cited, such as the "racket busting" grand juries working with Special Prose-
cutor, Thomas E. Dewey, or more recently, the Watergate grand jury
investigations. However, closer examination reveals that in almost every
instance the investigations were not initiated by the grand jury, rather by
a crusading newspaper in conjunction with a prosecutor.' Sadly, the
truth is that as an investigatory body, just as in the indicting function, the
grand jury is without the resources and training necessary for effective
independent action and thus serves solely the prosecutor's ends. "The only
difference is that in the [investigative situation] . . . the prosecutor does
not know the answers ahead of time."15
The investigation of the Cuyahoga County Sheriff's Department dur-
ing our term was possible only because of the extensive investigation con-
ducted and published by The Plain Dealer. Indeed, the resources for in-
vestigation available to the media astronomically exceed those of the grand
jury. Without the enthusiastic aid of the County Prosecutor's Office there
is no way that the Cuyahoga County Grand Jury can effectuate a compre-
hensive in-depth investigation of official corruption. And when the prose-
cutor is enthusiastic, he doesn't need the grand jury, except as a tool to be
used in exactly the same way as in the indicting phase. There are other in-
stitutional arrangements, not bound by the traditional arbitrary and op-
support. The prosecutor may in some circumstances and for good cause consistent
with the public interest decline to prosecute, notwithstanding that evidence may
exist which would support a conviction. Illustrative of the factors which the prose-
cutor may properly consider in exercising his discretion are:
(i) the prosecutor's reasonable doubt that the accused is in fact guilty;
(ii) the extent of the harm caused by the offense;
(iii) the disproportion of the authorized punishment in relation to the particular
offense or the offender;
(iv) possible improper motives of a complainant;
(v) reluctance of the victim to testify;
(vi) cooperation of the accused in the apprehension or conviction of others;
(c) In making the decision to prosecute, the prosecutor should give no weight to
the personal or political advantages or disadvantages which might be involved or
to a desire to enhance his record of convictions.
(d) In cases which involve a serious threat to the community, the prosecutor should
not be deterred from prosecution by the fact that in his jurisdiction juries have
tended to acquit persons accused of the particular kind of criminal act in question.
(e) The prosecutor should not bring or seek charges greater in number or degree
than he can reasonably support with evidence at trial.
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE: THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION, § 3.9 (1974).
154 Professor Morse' study indicated that fewer than five percent of grand jury investiga-
tions were initiated by the grand jury itself. See Morse, supra note 12, at 134-135, 362. The
Tweed Ring investigation in New York in 1872 was investigated by the New York Times.
See R. YOUNGER, supra note 10, at 182-84; and Campbell, supra note 106, at 179.
155 Fine, supra note 107, at 441.
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pressive features of the grand jury, that would better serve the investigatory
role.1
58
The Panglossian absurdity of assuming the grand jury can effectively
conduct its own independent investigation of a police enforcement agency
becomes apparent by merely setting forth the parameters of the problem.
Fourteen laymen, with no training in investigatory techniques, with no
investigative staff, no clerical help, and no independent counsel, attempt
to investigate charges of corruption, frequently brought forward by cour-
ageous law-enforcement officers at great personal risk. The grand jury
faces overwhelming difficulties where police agencies are involved since
there is sure to exist the special problems generated by group loyalty."'
There is also most certainly going to be political reverberations, with
all manner of pressure exerted on the grand jury and the witnesses.'58 There
is obviously no way to keep secret the identity of Deputy Sheriffs testifying
before a grand jury sitting in a building that is manned by Sheriff's De-
partment Personnel. 5 ' Statement of the problem obviates the need for
further elaboration. The grand jury, as presently constituted, is simply not
able to carry out an in-depth independent investigation of government cor-
ruption. If the prosecutor intends to carry out such an investigation, then
again, assign to him the responsibility, making appearances consistent with
reality.'
Other arguments for retention are put forward by grand jury pro-
ponents,' 6 ' but none meet the intractable impossibility of the non-adversarial
secret procedure of a grand jury acting as an effective screening device
156 Commissions, such as the Knapp Commission set up to investigate police corruption
in New York, appear far more effective. Legislative Committees; such as the Senate Com-
mittee on Presidential Campaign Activities, as well as Commissions and Citizen protest
organizations such as Common Cause and "Nader's Raiders" can "conduct open hearings"
and thereby "better publicize the problems and generate the public concern essential for
reform." L. CLARK, supra note 65, at 28.
'
5 7 See KNAPP CoMMIssIoN, supra note 3, at 6-7.
158The foreman did receive some most unusual phone calls during the term. It is a terribly
inhibiting thing to be told, as was the grand jury foreman, that he might be shot for pro-
ceeding with the investigation. One may consider this merely idle rumor, but when a witness
appearing in an investigation is shot at, as was alleged in our investigation, the rumor
becomes strikingly immobilizing.
159Witnesses reported being questioned about their testimony by their superiors shortly
after appearing before the grand jury.
180 See Julien, supra note 151.
161 Two are worthy of mention: (1) There is a great value in citizen participation in the
processes of government. Representative John Conyers takes this position.
There are only two institutions in our judicial system in which decision making authority
is given to people independent of the Government. The trial jury is one; the grand jury
is the other. I believe that it would be a mistake to eliminate the grand jury, or to
minimize its role at a time when one widely recognized problem of American democracy
is the increasing disaffection of American citizens with our political and legal insti-
tutions.
Quoted in Solowey, supra note 28, at 34. See also R. YOUNGER, supra note 10, at 148,
153; Shannon, The Grand Jury: True Tribunal of the People or Administrative Agency of
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for defendants whose innocence or guilt will ultimately depend on an open
and public hearing in an adversarial proceeding monitored by an impartial
judge trained to exclude from the proceeding much of the type of evidence
presented to the grand jury.
But there are many who object that abolition rather than reform is
throwing out the baby with the bath water. However, when one considers
the extent of the reforms required to give the grand jury a modest chance
to attain its reputed function, even its own mother wouldn't recognize
the baby. The array of necessary reforms to enhance independence would
include, at the least,' (1) additional resources, such as independent legal
counsel, investigators, and clerical staff, 6' (2) extensive training,'6' (3)
elimination of any rigid rule of secrecy," and (4) an institutionalized pro-
the Prosecutor? 2 N. MEx. L. REV. 141 (1972); Morse, supra note 12, at 333, 364; Note,
Evaluating the Grand Jury's Role in a Dual System of Prosecution: An Iowa Case Study,
supra note 15, at 1359. One cannot fault the value of the citizen participation in a democra-
cy, but from the above analysis it appears there is no meaningful effective participation by
grand jurors. Thus both quantitatively and qualitatively grand jurors would be better off
participating as petit jurors where they could have an actual impact. In response to a
questionnaire distributed to our grand jury the response most frequently made indicated
that the jurors had found the experience rewarding and informative. They also indicated
some frustration with the limitations placed on the institution. Our grand jury may have
been atypical in that the jurors read a hornbook on criminal law (Perkins) and each
had photocopies of the Ohio Criminal Code.
(2) In a period of intense public concern about crime, it is necessary to zealously main-
tain the constitutional protections afforded the defendant. Abolition of the grand jury guar-
antee would facilitate abrogation of other valuable constitutional protections. See Solowey,
supra note 28, at 34. Whatever, merit this "edge of the wedge" or domino theory con-
tentions might have concerning the federal Bill of Rights, it seems ephemeral as to state
bills of rights, which have frequently been amended over the years. Again, it bears em-
phasizing that the United States Supreme Court has never considered the fifth amendment's
indictment or presentment provision fundamental enough to make it applicable to the
states by incorporation into the Due Process Clause of the fourteenth amendment. See
note 84, supra. This means that the grand jury parameters of protection will be determined
solely by state judges who, unlike federal judges, do not enjoy life tenure and are therefore
more susceptible to political pressure. See Lewis, The High Court: Final... But Falliable,
19 CASE W. Rls. L. Rv. 528, 536, 545-546 (1968).
162 See Morse, supra note 12, at 357.
163 See R. YOUNGER, supra note 17, at 243; Bickner, supra note 106, at 466, 737, Note,
Evaluating the Grand Jury's Role in a Dual System of Prosecution: An Iowa Case Study,
supra note 115, at 1366-77.
1,4The training program should apprise the grand jurors fully concerning their power and
obligations, including the functions of protecting the innocent. Given the undeveloped nature
of Ohio law concerning grand jury powers this will be no easy task.
165 It has often been pointed out that secret proceedings are breeding places for arbitrary
and oppressive action. Justice Black tells us why this is so:
Secret inquisitions are dangerous things justly feared by free men everywhere. They
are the breeding place for arbitrary misuse of official power. They are often the be-
ginning of tyranny as well as indispensable instruments for its survival. Modern as
well as ancient history bears witness that both innocent and guilty have been seized by
officers of the state and whisked away for secret interrogation or worse until the
groundwork has been securely laid for their inevitable conviction. While the labels
applied to this practice have frequently changed, the central idea . . . remains un-
changing-extraction of 'statements' by one means or another from an individual by
officers of the state while he is held incommunicado.
In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330, 253-53 (1957) (J. Black dissenting). None of the reasons
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cedure whereby all citizens with complaints could have direct access to
the grand jury. 6' And to protect the rights of witnesses and the accused,
reform proposals generally include separating indicting from investigating
grand juries,"6 ' permitting counsel to be present during interrogation of
adduced for grand jury secrecy appear valid. Professor Dash has characterized grand jury
secrecy as "substantial as gossamer." Dash, The Indicting Grand Jury: A Critical Stage? 10
AM. CiuM. L. REV. 807, 819 (1972). Analysis of the reasons for secrecy leads him to that
conclusion. (1) Since probable cause for arrest requires less proof than an indictment,
any suspect who may flee can certainly be arrested prior to the indictment-which the
rubber stamping grand jury is sure to return. And if there is to be harrassment of wit-
nesses, surely that is more likely at trial than at the grand jury level-and trials are open
and public. Anyway, it is not difficult to find out who testified before a grand jury, as we
and our witnesses quickly learned. (2) The notion derogatory information will be dis-
closed about the unindicted defendant fails again to take into account the fact that with
rubber stamping the order of the day, the defendant could better prevent an indictment
and its concomitant notoriety if the facts were public so he could counter them. Also,
since no obligation of secrecy is imposed on witnesses they may reveal their testimony,
totally undercutting this rationale for the rule. (3) the idea that the rule enhances wit-
nesses' willingness to testify is subject to some of the same criticisms as above. Anyway,
the rule is designed for the "protection of the grand jury itself as a direct, independent
representative of the public as a whole, rather than those brought before the grand jury."
55 F.2d at 261. See also text accompanying note 80, supra. (4) The protection of the grand
jury's deliberations and votes naturally only require strict secrecy as to that aspect of
the proceedings. See Dash, at 819-23. The Supreme Court has acknowledged "the growing
realization that disclosure, rather than suppression . . . ordinarily promotes the proper
administration of justice." Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855, 870 (1966). It is not
at all startling to find Professor Boudin conclude: "The essential usefulness of secrecy
is clear." Boudin, supra note 98, at 34.
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has expressed concern for the dangers inherent in
secret proceedings:
It is a serious thing for any man to be indicted for an infamous crime. Whether
innocent or guilty he cannot escape the ignominy of the accusation, the dangers of per-
jury and error at his trial, the torture of suspense and the pains of imprisonment, or
the burden of bail. The secrecy of any judicial procedure is a tempting invitation
to the malicious, the ambitious, and the reckless to try to use it to benefit themselves
and their friends and to punish their enemies. If malicious, ambitious or over-zealous
men, either in or out of office, may with impunity persuade grand juries without any
legal evidence, either by hearsay testimony, undue influence, or worse means, to indict
whom they will, and there is no way in which the courts may annul such illegal
accusations, the grand jury, instead of that protection of 'the citizen against unfounded
accusation, whether it comes from government or be prompted by partisan passion,
or private enmity' . . . which it was primarily designed to provide, may become an
engine of oppression and a mockery of justice.
Schmit v. United States, 115 F.2d 394, 397 (6th Cir. 1940) quoting from McKinney v.
United States, 199 F.2d 31 (8th Cir. 1912) (Dissenting opinion).
166 There is an historical basis for permitting direct access. See R. YOUNGER, supra note 10,
at 52, 83. The Knapp Commission recommended institutionalizing direct access, especially
where official misconduct is involved due to the reluctance of complainants to report to
establishment type officials. See KNAPP COMMISSION, supra note 3, at 15, 255. At this
time the individual grand jurors may hear citizen complaints and then bring those to the
attention of the grand jury, but there is no institutionalized procedure to make access more
than theoretical.
167 As Richard Braun has noted, investigation is prosecutorial whereas examination of
evidence to ascertain if an indictment is justified is more quasi-judicial. "These functions
[investigating vs. indicting] are inconsistent in their very nature and should not be per-
formed by the same persons, just as a judge should not also serve as a prosecutor." Braun,
supra note 109, at 915. See also Bickner, supra note 43, at 736; and Peterson, The California
Grand Jury System: A Review and Suggestions for Reform, 5, PACuIc L.J. 1 (1974).
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witnesses,16 improving the quality of the evidence-coupled with a provision
for quashing indictments based on incompetent or illegal evidence,169 re-
quiring a transcript of grand jury proceedings, 70 and greater judicial super-
vision.17 ' It is recognized that some reforms could be accomplished im-
mediately, whereas others would require legislative or constitutional re-
vision.17 1 Paradoxically the reforms suggested would appreciably complicate
grand jury proceedings, transforming them into minitrials resulting in pro-
tracted proceedings whereby the defendants' interest would ultimately suffer
and the grand jury would only continue as "a pawn in a technical game in-
stead of . . . a great historic instrument of lay inquiry into criminal wrong-
doing."' 73
CONCLUSION
A survey of the literature and a term as grand jury foreman have con-
vinced me that the powers that be do not want a truly independent grand
jury which on its own would challenge the circumlocution office and the
contemporary political equilibrium. Instead, adhering to Hoffenstein's, "come
weal come woe, my status is quo," a docile and malleable institution is
praised as the "people's panel" serving as a bulwark of protection for the
individual against the state. Given this posture and the absence of any
lobby for change, reform is most unlikely. Further, as indicated above,
other constitutional arrangements would better serve the same ends as
the proposed reformed grand jury. It is revolting to discover that there
is no better reason for the continuation of a practice detrimental to the rights
of the individual than that it existed in the time of Henry II. The Grand
Jury no longer serves, nor given contemporary conditions, can it serve its
constitutional function of protecting the citizen from arbitrary and oppressive
prosecution by the state. Accordingly, the only rational course of action
requires abolition of the institution.
168 See Fine, supra note 107, at 494, 496; Julien, supra note 151, at 15. Arizona does permit
counsel to be present. ARIz. REV. STAT. § 21-412 (1973).
169 See Boudin, supra note 98, at 35.
170 See Fine, supra note 107, at 494, Boudin, supra note 98, at 35, Morse, supra note 12, at
330, 363.
171 Judges generally seem to manifest little interest in the grand jury. See Bickner, supra
note 99, at 663. This is perhaps due to their desire to permit the grand jury to maintain
its automony. Greater communication and support would certainly be produced by pro-
viding an institutional arrangement for grand jury access to common pleas judges for con-
sultation and advice. See Id. at 666.
172 See Reform of the Grand Jury System: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Constitutional
Rights of the Comm. on the Judiciary on S.3274, H.R. 1277, H.R. 6006, H.R. 6207, H.R.
10947, H.R. 11660, H.R. 11870, H.R. 14146, and H.J. Res. 46, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976);
Grand Jury Reform, Hearings before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Citizenship, and In-
ternational Law of the Comm. on the Judiciary on H.R. 94, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
173 United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 503, 512 (1943).
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